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Neuroscientific research on the removal of unpleasant and traumatic memories is still at a very early stage, but is
making rapid progress and has stirred a significant philosophical and neuroethical debate. Even if memory is
considered to be a fundamental element of personal identity, in the context of memory-erasing the autonomy of
decision-making seems prevailing. However, there seem to be situations where the overall context in which people
might choose to intervene on their memories would lead to view those actions as counterproductive. In this article,
I outline situations where the so-called composition effects can produce negative results for everyone involved,
even if the individual decisions are not as such negative. In such situations medical treatments that usually everyone
should be free to take, following the principle of autonomy, can make it so that the personal autonomy of the individuals
in the group considered is damaged or even destroyed. In these specific cases, in which what is called the “conformity to
context” prevails, the moral admissibility of procedures of memory-erasing is called into question and the principle
of personal autonomy turns out to be subordinate to social interests benefitting every member of the group.
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Neuroscientific research on the removal of unpleasant
and traumatic memories is at a very early stage, although
in recent years there has been significant progress in the
understanding of the mechanisms of memory and its
possible alterations [1]. The main purpose of those prac-
tices is to give relief to those who have experienced or
witnessed negative events (accidents, assaults, natural di-
sasters, terrorist attacks) which caused serious psycho-
logical consequences and, in severe cases, even led to
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In this sense, un-
pleasant memories should be distinguished from trau-
matic memories. Unpleasant memories are those we’d
rather not have, as they can jeopardize our serenity, but
typically do not lead to any known pathologies. Trau-
matic memories, on the contrary, are memories that
often lead to PTSD and other psychiatric disorders,
memories whose negative emotional charge prevents
one from leading a fully “normal” life.
In addition to forms of psychotherapy that use the
mechanisms of memory extinction in the reconsolida-
tion window [2], the drug currently most tested onCorrespondence: lavazza67@gmail.com
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unless otherwise stated.humans is propranolol. It is a beta-blocker molecule that
has the effect of mitigating the emotional burden of
memories, if taken a few hours after the negative event.
The semantic memory of the fact is not affected, while
the physiological arousal associated with emotions is
greatly reduced. The effectiveness of propranolol, how-
ever, has not been fully determined yet [3-6].
The recently investigated fact that long-term memory
is susceptible to disruption after a consolidated mnestic
trace is retrieved has led to try other innovative treat-
ments of fear memory [7]. Specifically, every time a
memory is retrieved a window of lability opens up and
reconsolidation subsequently occurs [8]. When a protein
synthesis inhibitor is given after retrieval, molecular and
cellular mechanisms of reconsolidation are disrupted
and long-term memories are significantly impaired on
subsequent tests [9]. Although that technique has only
been used in animal models, it may be feasible for use in
humans. “Theoretically, patients could be brought into a
clinical setting, presented with a stimulus that retrieves
the fearful stimulus and given a drug, and the fear mem-
ory would be weakened” [7].
Other substances and other techniques (from the abla-
tion of individual neurons to optogenetics) [10,11] haveis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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ments on humans still seem far away. Furthermore, it
has also been argued, at the conceptual level, that it
could be difficult (if not impossible) to erase memories
that are woven into a strongly interconnected semantic
network.
Still, the theoretical possibility of eliminating memor-
ies in humans has aroused a significant philosophical
and neuroethical debate [12-15]. There seem to be two
main contending paradigms: a “liberal” one and a “con-
servative” one [16]. In short, the former refers to the
principle of individual autonomy in a perspective linked
to J.S. Mill’s harm principle, while the latter is related to
the idea of authenticity and nature as a given that one
should accept and respect. Although the arguments pre-
sented by both sides are strong and convincing, it seems
that the first has more persuasive resources in the con-
text of contemporary philosophy. It also seems to better
capture the widespread view of the general audience,
given that it mirrors the prevailing individualistic trend.
It is worth recalling that the concept of autonomy “is
generally understood to refer to the capacity to be one's
own person, to live one's life according to reasons and
motives that are taken as one's own and not as the prod-
uct of manipulative or distorting external forces” [17].
Those who are autonomous can decide for themselves
without interference from others or personal limitations;
they can act according to a project of their own, de-
signed without constrictions. Autonomy also concerns
the freedom to decide what to believe in and the ability
to weight the pros and cons of a given course of action.
Another fundamental element regards the awareness
of the rules one establishes and follows; a central role in
this is played by rational reflection, i.e. the ability to as-
sess existing norms of conduct and traditions and to
choose, with the necessary balance between rational and
emotional aspects, which ones to follow and which to
ignore. Another way of putting this is to say that being
autonomous means having the critical ability to pay at-
tention to the outcome of one’s deliberations and being
able to be driven by one’s purposes. Being autonomous
means being oneself, following one’s own considerations,
desires, conditions and characteristics. It has to do with
being what can be considered one’s “true self” – which,
as such, becomes an indispensable value.
As I mentioned, the argument of autonomy, prima
facie, has a greater plausibility and cogency than the ob-
jections to memory amendments proposed by the con-
servative front. This is probably due to the loss of
strength of the substantive positions about human na-
ture. In fact, there is no univocal consensus as to what
the essence of personhood is and whether it is to be pre-
served, both because of the overcoming of boundaries in
an evolutionary perspective, and because of the ideal ofprogress and continuous improvement, which implies
that limits should be exceeded and borders pushed
further.
The considerations in defence of the authenticity of
the subject, challenged by the voluntary deletion of some
memories (be they unpleasant or traumatic), rely on the
idea of a core of the person that is objectively in becom-
ing, but still remains an identifiable point of reference
throughout the diachronic unfolding of existence (al-
though that is not the only concept of authenticity avail-
able; for instance, according to Sartre being authentic
consists in accepting that nothing and no one makes
you choose what you choose). This core of the person
consists of those distinctive features that maintain con-
tinuity in time and which one has to remain faithful to
(within the limits of imperfection and self-deceit that are
common to all human beings). Since a significant mem-
ory modification is likely to change personal identity, the
conservative side, given its concern for preserving au-
thenticity, cannot approve of such a modification.
However, the concept of authenticity seems to presup-
pose a centre of gravity, so to speak, endowed with a
kind of firmness that modern cognitive sciences are try-
ing to dismantle thanks to a growing body of experimen-
tal results. Our everyday understanding of ourselves as
conscious, rational, and responsible agents may be mis-
taken. Conscious agency may be merely epiphenomenal
[18,19], that is, the phenomenological expression of a
machinery that prepares, decides and causes our behav-
iour [20]. But if the self and the will are not really what
we believe they are, we are only left with a bundle of
sensations – as Hume put it – and the unity of self turns
out to be an illusion crafted by our consciousness (per-
haps due to the advantage it historically provided).
Therefore, it would make no sense to defend a particular
memory in order to preserve a part of our identity,
which would be changing and unstable anyway. That of
the fragmentation of the self is surely a radical hypoth-
esis, which maybe not even Hume would have endorsed,
and other more nuanced options are surely available.
Yet, it seems hard to deny that neuroscience – as well as
the philosophers working along with it – puts into ques-
tion the classical concept of authenticity.
Autonomy and composition effects
The liberal perspective and the argument of autonomy –
which defend one’s right to erase some of one’s trau-
matic memories – may be evaluated according to what I
propose to call “the argument of conformity regarding
memory-erasing”. This is the principle by which the
overall status of the beliefs and attitudes of the individ-
ual can only be disconnected to a certain extent from
the experiences of the individual himself and from the
beliefs and attitudes of other members of the group, or
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ticular as regards the manipulation of memory, tends to
produce dysfunctional consequences, which in the case
of memory removal end up undermining the very possi-
bility to fully exercise one’s autonomy.
Something similar to the principle of “conformity” can
be found in some considerations made by the President’s
Council on Bioethics as regards the erasure of memories
[12]. The new generation of psychoactive drugs can cre-
ate a separation between (cerebral) happiness and the
actions and experiences in the world. This could lead, in
the most extreme scenario, to a form of solipsism fol-
lowing artfully reconstructed memories. As exemplified
in the movie Strange Days by Kathryn Bigelow and
James Cameron, where people become “dependent” on
other people’s memories relived as if they were their
own, the selective removal of negative experiences would
make us desist from the effort to construct ourselves
and our world according to the model of virtue and self-
perfecting.
In the conservative perspective, this means not learn-
ing from negative experiences and running away from
what is unpleasant instead of facing it. The result can be
a state of passivity in the face of the objectively negative
conditions of the society in which one lives. In a condi-
tion of alienation due to, say, an unjust law or an unfair
distribution of wealth, one can go two ways. First, one
can try to change the social situation so as to improve
one’s condition. Second, one can remove one’s personal
discomfort with a psychoactive drug or through (false)
exciting experiences, such as in the film Strange Days,
without even trying to change external conditions.
Choosing this second strategy will not change the situ-
ation nor other people’s opportunity to change it. But if
many people went for this option, changing objectively
negative situations would become very difficult for those
who wished to try.
Obviously, this is an extreme situation, as scientifically
improbable as it is socially unrealistic. But there is a less
science-fictional tendency, encouraged by psychoactive
drugs, to consider feelings as ends in themselves and not
as corresponding with actual realizations, which are only
possible in lives immersed in a physical world and in
interpersonal relationships. The use of psychoactive
drugs could also lead to a gap between what we feel and
what others feel, thus “counterfeiting” the perception of
reality and one’s actions. In this sense, however, it seems
that we are still linked to the idea of authenticity, namely
the idea of a “naturalness” that should not be bypassed
or removed. According to these ideas, only those who
pass through all the trials of life can really be said to be
“human.” This is a legitimate view, but it takes some ele-
ments for granted, while they should be the outcome of
a strong moral argument.The “conformity” principle proposed here implies that
the personal autonomy of choice should act as a funda-
mental moral principle as regards the possibility to erase
one’s memories. But it also implies that its concrete form
should not be incompatible with the responsibility to-
wards the conditions of the world in which one dwells.
In fact, there are situations that we cannot change to
our liking and are given as pre-conditions for the exer-
cise of our autonomy. Enacting individual choices –
which globally add up, thus amplifying their scope – can
lead to changing those conditions in the world, nullify-
ing (wholly or in part) the possibility of some autono-
mous choices and making the very exercise of autonomy
dysfunctionala.
In other words, we will not enjoy the cerebral happi-
ness offered by drugs for selective forgetfulness (or for
other forms of enhancement) free of collateral precondi-
tions, which depend largely on other people. A society
dominated by the Hobbesian homo homini lupus rule
could certainly stand as a realm of personal autonomy,
but the state of continuous conflict would repeatedly put
at risk our ability to self-determination, since violent in-
terferences with our choices would be the norm. It
therefore seems that the “rule” of autonomy should be
implemented so that, even if everyone took it to the
highest degree, it would still be possible for everyone to
exercise it. Yet, this appears not to be always practicable.
Consequently, it may be reasonable to put some limita-
tions to the possible choices on the part of each subject,
in addition to Mill’s minimal principle of not harming
other people. I believe we should think in terms of real
life, considering concrete situations that can actually
occur, in order to realistically consider the conditions
that are necessary for the exercise of autonomy itself.
This argument may seem to ascribe some value to per-
sonal continuity. In fact, personal continuity is func-
tional to conformity in the sense in which I defined it. A
person can make use of the principle of autonomy to act
on her memory, altering in a way her continuity of exist-
ence, but doing so she can undermine the very condi-
tions for her own autonomy. In this perspective, the
continuity of existence, however, is not a value in itself,
as the conservative stance legitimately claims. What
matters is the conformity that prevents discrepancies be-
tween personal memory and external reality, with all the
consequences this entails. It can therefore be said that
the exercise of autonomy is based on an “instrumental”
respect of a certain personal authenticity and continuity.
Composition effects in practice
As a jurist, Adam Kolber [21,22] was among the first to
show how the use of a substance that weakens the mem-
ory can create a conflict between a) the right of society
to protect itself from criminals (prohibiting the destruction
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control their own memories (i.e. their minds). If the victim
of an aggression “deletes” the event from her memory or
even just its emotional consequence, she may lose both
the will and the ability to press charges. Society is thus also
deprived of important information to make sure that the
person responsible for the crime is prosecuted and other
people are protected from other crimes. The physician
prescribing propranolol (or another psychoactive drug) to
a woman who was raped, with the result that the woman
does not want or is unable to testify, would risk the charge
of obstruction of justice.
The important point here, however, is the behaviour of
the victim. She has a traumatic memory, one that most
likely will create permanent damage. Does she have the
right to cancel the memory, even if the criminal will thus
remain free and unpunished? The principle by Mill here
should be declined in a specific way. It does not seem, at
first sight, that by manipulating her own mind to pre-
vent a psychiatric disorder the person assaulted is doing
damage to others. But not pressing charges (or not testi-
fying) against a potentially serial rapist who attacked us
is like not stopping a rapist who is running away after
attacking someone else. If everybody adopted this behav-
iour, the safety of society as a whole would deteriorate
severely. This is not only because many criminals would
remain free and unpunished, but also because the grow-
ing awareness that many victims prefer to forget rather
than pressing charges would increase the propensity to
commit crimes. Many people who currently do not
commit crimes for fear of the legal consequences might
decide that it is worth the risk, given the low probability
of getting caught.
It can be argued that, in this way, people forced to
keep a traumatic memory are treated not as an end but
as a means for the welfare of society. In fact, some
people seem to have a more than justified claim to re-
move their traumatic memories – compared to merely
unpleasant ones – because they have been victims of
criminal acts and not, for example, of accidents due to
their own carelessness (provided that this can make a
difference). It can be argued, however, that each victim
who refuses to report or testify, preferring to delete their
traumatic memory, helps to make the environment even
less secure, to their own damage. The risk of a new, even
deadly attack will be more likely. If one is killed, of
course, any opportunity to exercise one’s autonomy is
reduced to zero: an unconstrained exercise of autonomy
can thus undermine the basic conditions of autonomy
itselfb.
Speaking of using people as a means, consider another
scenario. Holocaust survivors, had it been available at
the time, would have had good reasons to take a psycho-
active drug that could mitigate or erase the terriblememories of the death camps. An event so devastating
destroyed forever the lives of many of those people, so
much so that some of them have committed suicide. On
the other hand, the preservation of the memory of the
crimes perpetrated and the attempt to make future gen-
erations understand the Holocaust are generally consid-
ered the best tools for this kind of event not to happen
again. Survivors devoting part of their lives to this task
are not be mere instruments, but active agents to a
noble end surely worthy of being pursued, which would
compensate (at least partly) the price of not removing
the trauma.
It could be argued that, because of the composition ef-
fects, a single witness of the Holocaust who chose to for-
get her experience for her own personal well being
would be justified and would not be harming society.
But if everyone chose to do so, the effect would be disas-
trous. Perhaps a pragmatic solution, which does not con-
flict with any of the principles under discussion, would
be to allow the treatment to those who show the greatest
signs of suffering. Or, since the list of survivors is
known, one might ask an adequate number of survivors
to “volunteer” to keep their memories in order to pre-
serve the direct remembrance of extermination camps.
Negative composition effects arising from the combin-
ation of several individual choices are not rare, even in
contexts other than memory-erasing. Such composition
effects end up turning against the individuals’ very
choices, so that a central coordination limiting individual
autonomy, or even a prohibition of choice, may end up
being better not only globally, but also for each individ-
ual decision-maker. The issue of gender-based selection
of unborn children could offer an example here. Despite
the argument in favour of the parents’ autonomy of
choice (leaving aside the moral considerations about the
suppression of embryos), on a broad scale the overall
effect on society could lead to severe imbalances in the
quantitative ratio between males and females – an unin-
tended outcome emerging from the individual freedom
of choice.
The prevalence of males or females could then lead to
social imbalance (lack of wives or husbands, lack of
workers with certain characteristics, gender tensions)
that would be negative for many (even though not for
everyone, as some could even benefit from it), outweigh-
ing the benefit of being able to chose to have a child of a
given gender. Individual preferences, family welfare and
the welfare of the new-born could also be nullified by
the unpredictable situation following from such choices.
For example, one may prefer a male because there are
few in the proximal environment, and then find out that
everyone else has had a son in the meantime. Further-
more, the advantage/disadvantage of being of a given
gender can change with the new ratio in the younger
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ing gender selection can be rational and justified, even at
the expense of people’s freedom of choice.
The example of abused women
Back to memory-erasing, if many people freely decided
to use a hypothetical drug that can eliminate guilt (eras-
ing the memories of negative deeds done by the subject),
we would risk having a much more inhospitable society
(this would not concern violations of the law, but the in-
stinctual benevolence that generally keeps us from mis-
treating our neighbours). If no one were willing to bear
in mind the horror one witnessed, we would risk living
in a world where atrocities are easily repeated, making it
more difficult to exercise autonomy itself. In these cases,
however, we are talking about too broad and general sce-
narios, in which counterexamples could be designed and
proposed. Only in extreme scenarios would there be a
composition effect strong enough to justify a restriction
of individual choice about the partial deletion of one’s
memories.
So, let’s take a “negative” example, one that is narrower
and more compelling. Imagine the case of a strongly
patriarchal society in which most women are subjected
to domestic violence or sexual abuse. Generally speak-
ing, victims suffer in silence out of fear and shame. On
the one hand, men resort to physical abuse, on the other
hand there is a social system that stigmatizes and mar-
ginalizes those who try to rebel. The situation is thus
perpetuated, with women traumatized and deprived of
any right. In such a context, sometimes the suffering or
humiliation are so strong that some women think that
nothing would be worse than staying in their condition,
and therefore try to react. It can be said that some pro-
gress in the recognition of the dignity of discriminated
groups has been achieved in this way, even though it’s
not a universal solution, since the rebellion of individual
women might make the general situation worse due to
the violent reaction of the patriarchal society.
But let's say that in our supposed society a medical
treatment becomes available (say, a pill) to erase the
memory of all abuses, even the worst. Given the possi-
bility of a risk-free relieving solution, the women in our
thought experiment freely decide to take the drug.
Thanks to the effect of the substance, the memory of the
violence fades or vanishes and the trauma is absorbed, at
least for some time. Thus, it is conceivable that the over-
all condition of women will get even worse. The sexist
system will get even stronger, as the drug will make any
attempt to protest even more unlikely.
Thus, even in the utilitarian perspective of the reduc-
tion of suffering, one could not speak of an actual
achievement, given that the violence might become
more frequent if males thought that women were notsuffering that much, after all. In fact, the women taking
psychoactive drugs would enjoy a temporary subjective
relief to their pain, but their objective conditions would
remain the same as before. Also, reducing the pain of
the trauma means weakening pleasures that are just as
great, such as emancipation and justice. One may then
wonder whether to produce and distribute the psycho-
active drugs in a male-dominated society would not lead
to a negative outcome, further reducing the autonomy of
women it started out to defend.
Of course, it can reasonably be argued that increasing
the opportunity of choice is still a goal to be pursued.
Secondly, one could argue that the autonomy exerted by
subordinated women is a false autonomy. As to the first
consideration, one could reply that having opportunities
for choice is not necessarily a good thing per se, if the al-
ternatives do not envisage an improvement – or at least,
a potential one. A sufferer of chronic pain can be pro-
posed to have his limbs cut as a decisive “treatment”;
however, it is intuitive that the ability to chose this op-
tion does not necessarily improve his overall well-being.
Such choice would only make sense within a perspective
from which the elimination of pain is evaluated as pref-
erable to the ability of living and moving independently
(which is rather questionable).
As for autonomy with regard to one’s memory, women
taking the psychoactive drugs can intuitively be consid-
ered capable of self-determination (although this may
depend on one’s conception of autonomy: not all sub-
stantive accounts of autonomy may judge such persons
to be fully autonomous). Now, the problem lies precisely
in the exercise of rational self-determination at the indi-
vidual level regarding the use of such a powerful tool, as
in the case in question. In essence, each subject does
what prima facie appears the best for herself (just as a
hypothetical NGO secretly providing the drug sup-
posedly does so for the good of everyone), while actually
worsening the general situation. On the other hand, al-
most no one can be a decision-maker able to predict all
the aggregate consequences of one’s decisions, even as-
suming the Kantian imperative to act according to a
maxim which can become a universal law. Finally, even
if we supposed that the case of abused women is not
valid as a condition to exercise autonomy, the examples
of the inhospitable and brutal society we have seen be-
fore would still be strengthened. In fact, if what matters
are external conditions and social relations affecting the
self-determination of those women, then using auton-
omy in a certain way would turn against autonomy itself,
limiting it or even making it false.
It can also be argued that the example of abused
women lends itself to different interpretations, that is, to
three modes of argumentation. In particular, according
to what we might call “Argument one”, if radical
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self-control as well as their social freedom is immedi-
ately affected, while others aren’t. In this case, the typical
liberal paradigm seems to be at work, with the possibility
for everyone to choose how to act in their own best
interest, without others being affected, according to
Mill’s harm principle. Nevertheless, one could argue that
abused women who erase their memories would some-
what remain trapped within an ideology of enslavement.
According to “Argument two”, the group of people
who undergo radical memory modification have their
capacity for self-control and their social freedom af-
fected. Still, other social groups won’t see any reduction
of social autonomy or diminution of civic liberty. In this
case, there are composition effects to the sole detriment
of the group of abused women who take psychoactive
drugs for the removal of memories. The other members
of society, however, still seem immune from the conse-
quences of these choices.
Finally, “Argument three” goes as follows: if any suffi-
ciently large number of people undergo radical memory
modification in a society, not only will their own auton-
omy suffer, but everyone in the society will see their civic
freedom affected in the long run. In this interpretation,
even those who are not taking medication for the re-
moval of the memories are damaged (unbeknownst to
them, at least in a first stage). Why? It may be useful
here to introduce a Hegelian perspective. The reason
why patriarchal men would also suffer from less self-
autonomy and less civic freedom is because they would
stay trapped in the slavish ideology of that society, failing
to enjoy the higher consciousness and ethical life coming
from full reciprocity with women. This argument is
more challenging and requires a degree of agreement on
some values that are not instrumental, while some limi-
tations of autonomy about taking psychoactive drugs
can also descend from consequentialist considerations.
Nevertheless, “Argument three” shows that interventions
on memory may have important consequences at differ-
ent levels, which would be wrong to underestimate and
deserves further reflection.
The conformity objection to memory-erasing
The conformity objection is also suitable for a recent ex-
ample devised by Walter Glannon, [23] which is the fol-
lowing. A very emotional and anxious young scholar has
a small defaillance during a conference that he considers
very important to his career. The thought of that event
continues to distress him and threatens to jeopardize his
public activity. Thus he decides to take a drug that
makes the emotional charge of memories fade so as to
make the disturbing event disappear from his mind. Ac-
cording to Glannon, such decision is morally incontest-
able from all points of view. And yet, what led the youngman to his first failure could be a structural weakness
that, by taking the drug, he will not even begin to ad-
dress, thus exposing himself to a number of other poten-
tial failures. And even though he will still be able to use
the tranquilizing psychoactive drugs, his colleagues will
not forget the signs of his inadequacy to the role. After
being at peace and confident for a while the scholar
might actually end up ruined. His “cerebral” world will
eventually be challenged by external reality: that is, the
fact that he is no longer valued as a scholar. Reality will
knock at his door and, at that point, no medication will
help – unless we want to posit a form of fact-denying
solipsism.
It is not just that forgetting what others know (which
is also an important factor to consider) is impracticable.
It is that we have to deal with the basic conditions that
constrain the exercise of our faculties. If one wants to
live in society, or even in the slightest relationship with
one’s fellow human beings, the choice not to deal with
external “objective” situations becomes morally relevant
because everyone (even implicitly, by the mere fact of
being placed in a context of social interactions) takes on
responsibilities that one cannot reject at will. Those who
opted for oblivion, even in the full exercise of their au-
tonomy, would be likely to become detached from reality
in an ethically unacceptable way. This does not happen
when deleting a single unpleasant memory (provided
that one day it will be possible), but it does when enter-
ing an overall perspective about one’s memory. Every
unwelcome memory can potentially become the target
of cancellation, resulting in the construction of an al-
tered biography that does not correspond to our real life.
This detachment is what we have when our mental life
and our perception of reality no longer match the per-
ception that other people have. On the one hand this
goes against the principle of authenticity and, on the
other hand, it has important consequences both for the
person who makes up her memory and for those with
whom she interacts. And when the conformity between
memory and reality is lost, the consequences are often
dysfunctional and negative.
As I hope to have shown, it seems that only those who
have never entered into binding relationships, such as a
person who always lived alone in a forest, could be able
to claim full sovereignty on her memory in all situations.
Conclusion
Thus, the individual autonomy in memory-erasing seems
to be subjected some limitations, which are not the re-
sult of an a priori moral argument, but follow from the
consideration of the consequences of individual choices.
Such limits derive from the constraints of social life,
which entail that, in some cases, the very pre-conditions
of autonomy could be put at risk by the massive use of
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tralized coordination, which is in turn a form of restric-
tion of autonomy, personal choice can backfire both on
the individual who takes the choice and on the group to
which she belongs. In this sense, the liberal perspective
faces some moral limits that I suggest we call “principle
of conformity regarding memory-erasing”c.
Endnotes
aThat can seem analogous to Charles Taylor’s argu-
ment for liberal communitarianism. In brief, Taylor [24]
maintains that liberal political institutions are very valu-
able, but that they tend to produce actions that gradually
chip away at them. He therefore proposes constraints on
what is allowed that seem to go beyond what liberalism
would permit, but that are actually justified by the need
to protect liberal institutions themselves.
bCognitive liberty theorists like Jan Christoph Bublitz
and Reinhard Merkel [25] are against the interference of
state and non-state entities with human cognition in
general, and specifically with an individual’s mental
“inner realm”. But while the first obligation they propose
is to protect individuals from other people’s interference
with their cognitive processes, the second obligation is
to ensure that individuals have the freedom to modify
their own consciousness and mental processes in any
way they want, including direct cognitive intervention
through memory-erasing drugs. This radical version of
cognitive liberty is likely to dismiss the importance of
social interests as ethical or political reasons for out-
weighing personal self-determination. The main argu-
ment of this paper is intended to be an objection to
such view. I posit that although everyone should be free
to take any drugs, following the principle of autonomy,
there are occasions on which the individual choice to
take some drugs can jeopardise the very bases of
autonomy.
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